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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
· STATE OF UTAH 
HAROLD E. 'VATKINS 
Plaintiff and Appellant 
-vs.-
UTAH POULTRY AND Fl\.RMERS 
COOPERATIYE, a Corporation 
Defendant and Respondent 
Case No. 777 4 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF CASE 
A jury with all of the evidence before them, includ-
ing the injuries which plaintiff has taken pains to call 
to the court's attention and with an opportunity to ob-
serve the demeanor of the witnesses, decided the issues 
of fact in the present case in defendant's favor. Our 
inquiry at this time should not be to search out that evi-
dence which might sustain the plaintiff's theory, as plain-
tiff has so artfully done in his brief, but to determine if 
there is sufficient evidence upon which the jury might 
reasonably have found as they did. 
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In that part of his brief having to do with the issues 
of fact, plaintiff argues that there was no evidence that 
intoxication was a proximate or contributing cause of the 
collision. The great preponderance of the evidence sus-
tains the conclusion that plaintiff's intoxication was the 
proximate cause of the collision. It should be pointed out, 
however, that the issue of plaintiff's negligence should 
not be so limited. Plaintiff alleged in his con1plaint that 
"the defendant recklessly, carelessly and negligently 
drove its heavily loaded international truck against the 
left front end of plaintiff's car," (R. 1) and that the in-
juries to the plaintiff occurred as a result of this negli-
gence. Defendant denies that "this defendant or said 
Matherson (defendant's driver) was negligent as al-
leged therein or negligent in any manner whatsoever." 
And alleges "that said accident was solely caused, or the 
cause thereof was proximately contributed to by the 
negligent acts, conduct and omissions of the plaintiffs." 
(R. 3-4) Therefore, the issues of fact in this case are not 
limited to whether or not the intoxication of the plaintiff 
was a proximate or contributing cause of the accident but 
are whether a jury might reasonably find from the evi-
dence that there was no negligent conduct on the part 
of the defendant which was a proximate cause of any 
injury to the plaintiff or, the jury having found that 
there was such negligence, whether they, as reasonable 
men, might also have found that the injuries to the plain-
tiff were proximately contributed to by the negligent acts, 
conduct and omissions of the plaintiff himself. 
F·or convenience, we will follow the same breakdown 
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a~ the plaintiff in di~eu~~ing the evidence and will fin.;t 
di~eus~ the evidence pertaining to the intoxieation of the 
plaintiff and then the evidence pertaining to the proxi-
mate cau~e of the autmnobile collision out of which this 
action arose. 
~T~\TE~LENT OF FACTS 
A. Evidence pertaining to intoxication. 
The behavior and condition of the plaintiff was 
first observed by :Jir. Jack Scott as the plaintiff entered 
~Ir. Scott's store in Cedar City at about 5 :30 in the after-
noon of the day of the accident. Mr. Scott testified 
that ··he was intoxicated, very much so ... he was untidy 
in his appearance, his clothing. His eyes were quite 
bloodshot, his tongue was thick, his conversation was a 
gablous character, and he couldn't hardly hold himself 
up." (R. 126-127) After a short conversation (R. 128)· 
~Ir. Scott found it necessary to help plaintiff to the door 
and out of his store because he was annoying a boy who 
worked for :Jir. Scott. (R. 129) 
A short time later, l\Ir. Scott encountered the plain-
tiff for a second time. This time on the street in front 
of his store about three or four doors south of his es-
tablishment. Mr. Scott was engaged in a conversation 
with a l\Ir. Tuckett and a Mr. Christensen when the plain-
tiff approached the group and directed the remark "Hi 
stupid" toward them. (R. 131-135) Mr. Tuckett, who 
most closely observed the plaintiff at this time, stated 
that he told :Mr. Watkins, the plaintiff, to go get lost. 
At that point plaintiff raised the "22" calibre rifle he was 
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carrying and pointed it toward the three conversants. 
Mr. Tuckett told him "he would look silly as hell with 
that gun sticking out of his body" (R. 135) whereupon, as 
testified by Mr. Tuckett, plaintiff "staggered over to his 
automobile on the south side of the car, and he then 
reached into the window of his car and pulled the window 
up, and stuck the rifle out, pulled the bolt back, raised 
the gun up at the three of us, the backs of Mr. Scott and 
Mr. Seegmiller, and toward my face." The group sepa-
rated at that time. ·(R. 132-135) 
Mr. Layron Christensen, the manager of Reed's 
Riteway store, whose premises adjoin those of Mr. 
Seott's, testified that plaintiff was in his establishment at 
about 5 :30 p.m. the same afternoon and offered to sell 
Mr. Christensen a gun. This witness stated that plaintiff 
appeared wobbly and talked in jerks and that the plain-
tiff stated to him "well I am drunk, but don't think I am 
proud of it." "I am really ashamed. I am just having 
a good time." (R. 137) 
One hour later, approximately 6 :30 p.m., plaintiff 
entered "Ted's Bar" in Cedar City. The proprietor, 
Mr. Kent Farnsworth, a witness for the defendant, on 
cross examination testified as follows concerning plain-
tiff's condition at that time: "As he came in the door he 
straightened up. Sat down and ordered a beer. Then 
after he ordered the beer I could see he was incapacitated 
because the minute he went to get it he tipped it over, 
and I wouldn't sell him any more" . . . "After he tipped 
the beer over he was in no condition for another glass 
of beer." (R. 140) Plaintiff had been in Ted's Bar earlier 
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in the day and Farnsworth had told hiln at that tin1e to 
go back to St. George because he would only get in 
trouble. (R. 139) ~Ir. Farnsworth finally escorted plain-
tiff out of his establishn1ent because of his unruly con-
duet. ( R. 139) 
Between S :00 and S :30 p.m. plaintiff. was in Milt's 
Circus Lounge, as testified to by l\Irs. Orissa Hirshi, 
the bartender. He had been in the lounge earlier in the 
day and .Jirs. Hirshi had been warned by her brother 
not to sell him any beer. (R. 143) 1\frs. Hirshi stated 
that the plaintiff was insulting and had been drinking. 
(R. 143) A short conversation followed Mrs. Hirshi's 
refusal to sell plaintiff any more beer. (R. 144) -Mr. 
Robert E. Cooley, a patron, who entered the establish-
ment at the same tiine as the plaintiff, stated to Mrs. 
Hirshi, "This fellow had had too much to drink," and 
offered to summon the police. (R. 144) Thereafter, 
police officer "\Villiam Hills arrived and took plaintiff 
into his custody. (R. 164) Mr. CooJey watched plaintiff 
leave with officer Hills and stated that the plaintiff stag-
gered as he walked up the stairs to the street entrance 
(R. 164) 
Officer William Hills of the Cedar City Police testi-
fied he first noticed the plaintiff as he entered the Circus 
Lounge in response to Mr. Cooley's call and saw the 
plaintiff leaning heavily on the bar, face flushed and his 
eyes quite glassy and with the appearance of being in-
toxicated. (R. 150) Officer Hills requested Mr. Watkins 
to follow him outside which the plaintiff did, although, 
the officer had to help him up the stairs to the street be-
cause of plaintiff's wobbly condition. (R. 151) Once out-
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side both men entered the police car. As officer Hills 
backed away from the curb he remarked to plaintiff, 
"Well, pal, it looks like you have got kind of a pretty good 
load on." The plaintiff replied, "Yes, I have been drink-
ing." (R. 151) Officer Hills drove the police car around 
Cedar City for a short time and then drove to plain-
tiff's car and informed him that he would not book him 
if he would not drive the car. Mr. Watkins promised not 
to drive and stated that he was waiting for another man 
who had the keys to the car and who would drive. (R. 
153) Plaintiff stated, "Oh, I know you are giving me a 
break ... and you could probably book me with justifica-
tion." (R. 153-154) Officer Hills left the plaintiff in his 
automobile sitting on the right hand side of the driver's 
seat. The officer waited a few minutes and responded 
to another call. When he returned between 8 :57 and 9 :24 
o'clock p.m., at the most 33 minutes. before the accident 
occurred at a point 32 miles distant, the plaintiff was still 
sitting in his vehicle as the officer had left him. (R. 171) 
The officer's testimony as to the time was verified by the 
radio log. (Exhibits 1 and 2) 
Ernest Pearce, a state highway patrolman who as-
sisted in the investigation of this accident, testified that 
when he arrived at the scene of the accident, shortly 
after 10:00 o'clock p.m., and about an hour after the acci-
dent, the plaintiff was still lying on the seat of his car 
"profaning in a belligerent state of mind." (R. 203) It 
was his opinion from his observation of the plaintiff that 
he was intoxicated. (R. 206) 
Thomas H. Semmons, the highway patrolman who 
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wn~ in eharg-e of the inye~tigation, who incidentally was 
called a~ a witne~s hy the defendant and not the plaintiff, 
te~tified that he could smell the odor of liquor aboLlt 
plaintiff's car and that in his opinion the plaintiff was 
under the influence of liquor at the time. 
Dr. Broadbent, the doctor who treated the plaintiff 
at the Iron County Hospital at about 11 :30 o'clock the 
night of the accident, testified that the plaintiff was an-
tagonistic, objected to treatment and was very abusive in 
his language (R. 289). While he admitted that there 
were some elements of plaintiff's injury which possibly 
could have explained the plaintiff's behavior (R. 297), 
it \Ya~ the opinion of this witness, specially train'ed to 
diagnose the physical condition of persons, that the plain-
tiff was intoxicated. (R. 291) The following morning, 
plaintiff apologized to the doctor for his conduct and 
'"said he was sorry for the way he had acted because when 
he drank he wasn't exactly responsible." (R. 290) 
Phyllis Nelson, the nurse at the Iron County Hospi-
tal who assisted Dr. Broadbent, testified that the first 
thing she noticed about the patient, plaintiff, was the 
smell of liquor about him (R: 352) and that "he was 
profaning . . . he was belligeTent and uncooperative in 
every way. His language was ... well, it isn't what we 
would expect from a patient in the hospital in his con-
dition." (R. 353) Her opinion was that he was under the 
influence of liquor. (R. 354) The following morning the 
plaintiff asked if he had given them a hard time during 
the night and said, "If I did, I am sorry, because I was 
clrinking. I had been drinking." (R. 355) 
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B. Evidence pertaining to the proximate cause of the 
accident. 
By their verdict in favor of the defendant, the jury 
must necessarily have decided either that the defendant 
had not been shown by a preponderance of the evidence 
to have been guilty of any negligence which was the 
proximate cause of the collision or, if they did believe 
defendant was guilty of such negligence, then the plain-
tiff was also guilty of some negligent conduct which was 
a proximate cause of his own injuries. Let us examine 
the record to determine if they might have reasonably so 
found. 
There is little, if any, evidence of any negligence on 
the part of the defendant. Plaintiff testified that the de-
fendant's truck appeared to be overlapping his side of the 
highway as the two vehicles approached the point of col-
lision near a bridge about seven miles north of Paragona, 
·Utah on US Highway 91 from opposite directions. (R. 
60) Highway Patrolman, Ernest Pierce, testified that 
the tire marks left by plaintiff's vehicle started about 
10 to 20 feet north of the bridge (R. 32) and that they 
swung across the road and back and then way over." (R. 
33) Exhibit G was received for the limited purpose of-
ferred, that was, merely to illustrate the officer's testi-
mony as to the beginning of the alleged tire marks, and 
for no other purpose. (R. 39) Officer Pierce admitted 
that he didn't make any extensive investigation in the 
area north of the bridge by reason of the fact that he 
and State Trooper 'Semmons had already conCluded that 
the point of impact was south of the bridge; (R. 43) and, 
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for the further reason, that Officer . Se1n1nons was the 
principal inYestigating officer and that he was merely 
assisting by regulating traffic and holding the measuring 
tape. (R. 364) He testified that he was dissatisfied with 
the investigation 1nade on the night of the accident and 
suggested to Officer Sem1nons that he go out the next 
morning, "and n1aybe he could find more definite about 
where they hit." (R. -!2-36-!) Theodore Atherly, another 
witness for plaintiff, testified that he observed these tire 
marks starting about four feet east of the center line 
and continuing to the plaintiff's car. (R. 114) He further 
testified that he observed two fresh gouge marks on the 
·highway west of the center or on the defendant's side of 
the road. (R. 362) 
Contrast this evidence of negligence on the part of 
the defendant with that on the part of the plaintiff. 
Plaintiff had a history of being drunk from five o'clock 
on the afternoon, four and one-half hours before the 
accident at 9 :30 p.m. (R. 1) to 11 :30 that night. Plaintiff 
testified that after he observed the lights of the ap-
proaching truck east of the center line or on his side of 
the road, he continued to drive toward those lights for 
some distance without making any attempt to stop his 
vehicle except to slightly touch the brakes with his foot 
when he saw the bridge. (R. 108) LaMar W. Matheson, 
the driver of the defendant's automobile, testified that 
the overall length of the truck was 23 feet 6 inches and 
that the truck measured 94 inches in over-all width. (R. 
218) The truck had amber clearance lights on both cor-
ners of the bed (R. 219) and all lights were burning when 
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the truck made its last stop at Beaver, Utah. (R. 220) 
He stated that the speed of the truck as it approached 
the bridge where the collision occurred was between 45 
and 50 miles an hour, (R. 220) and that he was traveling 
on the west side of the highway. (R. 221) He first noticed 
the lights of the plaintiff's automobile approximately 
two miles away and observed that they were approaching 
him much faster than the other traffic on the highway. 
(R. 221) At the time the plaintiff's automobile passed the 
cab of the truck the right wheels of the truck were on the 
west edge of the hard surface. (R. 221-222) The only 
warning he had of the impending collision was just a 
moment· before the impact when the plaintiff's auto-
mobile seemed to come toward him or to turn toward the 
truck. (R. 229) Matheson brought the truck to a stop 
about 200 feet south of the point of collision and then 
drove the truck another hundred feet forward to get it 
completely off of the highway. (R. 222) As he walked 
back along the highway to the point where plaintiff's 
car had come to rest, he observed the jack and tools of 
the truck just about half way in the west lane of the 
highway, close to the north side of the bridge. (R. 223) 
(The location of the jack is marked "K" with a circle. 
around it on the diagram drawn on the board labeled 
P.A.J.) This was a twelve ton hydraulic jack weighing 
about 25 pounds, (R. 223) which had been in the tool box 
under the left front corner of the truck bed prior to the 
accident. (R. 224) The tool box was broken and scattered 
about the road. (R. 224) It is reasonable to assume that 
the box was broken by the impact of the two cars and the 
10 
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heayy jack cmne to re~t on the highway smnewhere near 
the point of i1npact. 
The passeng·er in defendant's automobile, Glen Gar-
field, had aerial gunnery training in the anny and quali-
fied as an expert in aerial fire which required that he 
be able to judge the relative speeds of different objects. 
(R. 175) He testified defendant's truck was traveling 
south approxi1nately 45 miles per hour (R. 176), and the 
speed of the approaching car "appeared to be consider-. 
ably faster because you noticed in the distance it was 
coming at a very rapid rate. You can't tell how fast, but 
you just know, from watching any car coming out on the 
open highway, that it is coming at a high rate of speed. 
T~at is, as far as judging, you know it is cmning fast if 
the distance between you clo~es very rapidly." (R. 176) 
He testified he was watching the side of the highway and 
it appeared to him the truck was almost off the oiled 
surface of the road and that the truck continued to travel 
near the very edge of the highway up until the time of 
impact. (R. 177) 
On the night of the accident the officers determined 
the point of impact to be a raspberry smear south of the 
bridge. (R. 41) Mr. Garfield and Mr. Matheson had 
procured six cases of raspberries in Orem, Utah, which 
were being carried in the tool box. When the tool box 
was shattered by the impact, the berries were apparently 
scattered all over the highway. (R. 184). The raspberry 
smear extended south from the bridge and was pre-
dominantly on the west side of the road. (R. 279) The 
center of the smear was 65 feet south of the bridge and 
11 
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seven feet ten inches from the west shoulder of the hard 
surface of the highway and eleven feet ten inches ftom 
the east shoulder. (R. 306) The morning following the 
accident the investigating officer, Thomas H. Semmons, 
returned to the scene of the collision and re-examined 
the marks on the highway. At that time he found two 
gouge marks on the west side of the highway. He testi-
fied the most southerly gouge marks were two feet from 
the center of the road on the west side about five to seven 
feet north of the bridge. (R. 307) It was roughly about 
two inches across and four inches long and about an inch 
and a half to two inches deep. (R. 307) The second 
gouge mark was a foot and a half north and about six 
inches east of the first gouge mark still on the west 
side of the road. (R. 308) There were tire marks in the 
vicinity of the gouge marks which the officer took to be 
the left side of the Ford. These marks continued in a 
straight line out from these two gouge 1narks in a north-
easterly direction commencing in the center of the road. 
They then crossed over to the east and followed the 
course testified to by Officer Pearce. The officer identi-
fied point 1 on Exhibit 2 as the southerly most gouge 
mark, point 2 on Exhibit 2 as the next gouge mark and 
point 3 as the beginning of the tire marks. (R. 338) Wil-
liam C. Dalton, who accompanied Deputy Sheriff Arch 
Benson, to the scene of the accident, (R. 244) follo:wed 
the course of plaintiff's Ford car back from the place 
where it came to rest down along the tire marks :which 
zig zagged across the highway to two gouge marks on the 
12 
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west side of the road. (R. :2-lS) (See photograph of dia-
gram on board labeled "Dalton.") 
Sheriff ~\rthur Nielson of Iron County placed these 
gouge 1narks six or seyen feet north of the bridge ( R. 
:2G-!) and a couple of feet west of the center. (R. 265) 
He did not locate the tire 1narks 1nade by what he assun1ed 
was the left wheel of the Ford automobile for about 
four or five feet frmn the gouges, but he was able to lo-
cate what he considered the right wheel marks four or 
five feet east of the center line. (R. 267) 
There can be little doubt but that the actual point 
of impact was in the immediate vicinity of the gouge 
marks six or seven feet north of the bridge and two feet 
over on the west or defendant's side of the highway. 
The plaintiff himself puts the point of impact in the 
immediate vicinity of the bridge. (R. 60-61, R. 81) The 
passenger in the defendant's automobile, Glen Garfield, 
from his own observations at the time of the collision 
fixed the point of impact as just north of the bridge. 
(R. 200) The driver of the truck, Matheson, testified 
that the truck was in the close vicinity of the west bridge 
abutment at the time of the impact. (R. 221-222) 
Claude E. Burton, a garage owner from Parowan, 
Utah, called to the scene of the accident with his wrecker, 
(R. 257) testified that when he towed plaintiff's car in 
that night, there was no tire on the left front wheel rim. 
(R. 262) He returned the next morning and picked up 
the tire which had come off the broken rim. "The tire 
was blowed out, or it had a gouge in it, a big hole in the 
tire and tube ... Oh, I would say from three to four 
13 
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inches approximately. 1 didn't measure it." (R. 259) 
Glen Garfield testified he noted what appeared to be part 
of a fender of plaintiff's vehicle was stuck in the left 
corner of the truck bed, (R. 182) and that a piece of tire 
was imbedded between the tire and the rim of the left 
rear dual wheel on the truck. (R. 182) Matheson also 
observed a piece of tire imbedded between the bead of the 
truck tire and the rim of the left rear wheel. (R. 221) 
The investigating officer, Semmons, testified that 
the picture, Exh~bit F, depicted the damage to the truck 
and that he noted scrapping marks on the tire and his 
attention was called to a piece of rubber wedged in the 
rim of the outside left tire. (R. 272) 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT NO. I 
THE SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE COLLISION 
WAS THE NEGLIGENCE OF THE PLAINTIFF. 
POINT NO. II 
EVIDENCE OF PLAINTIFF'S INTOXICATION WAS 
PROPERLY SUBMITTED TO THE JURY AS AN ELEMENT 
OF PLAINTIFF'S NEGLIGENCE. 
POINT NO. III 
PLAINTIFF WAS NOT DEPRIVED OF A FAIR AND 
IMPARTIAL TRIAL BY THE IMPROPER ADMISSION OF 
EVIDENCE. 
POINT NO. IV 
THE COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY UP-
ON THE PLAINTIFF'S THEORY OF THE EVIDENCK 
14 
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_-\RGUMENT 
POINT NO.1 
THE SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE COLLISION 
WAS THE NEGLIGENCE OF THE PLAINTIFF. 
~-\s was pointed out at the outset, the ultimate issue 
of fact in this case was not whether plaintiff's intoxica-
tion was a proximate cause of the collision. Intoxica-
tion was merely one of the elements which the jury might 
have considered in determining the ultimate question of 
negligence. 
A lTtah case which bears striking similarity to the 
case at bar is nioser v. Zion's Cooperative Mercantile 
Institution, 114 Utah 58, 197 P2d 136. Two vehicles ap-
proached each other on U.S. 91 approximately one and 
a half 1niles south of Logan, Utah. The accident occurred 
66 feet south of the bridge. The issue was stated by the 
.court as follows on page 67 of the Utah Report: 
"The ultilnate question of fact in this case is, of 
course, which of the two drivers failed to keep his vehicle 
on the proper side of the road." .The court held : 
"The determination of this ultimate fact was 
for the jury. And the jury having determined 
this question in plaintiff's favor, and the trial 
court having denied defendant's motion for new 
trial, this court cannot say that the trial court 
abused its discretion unless there was no sub-
stantial evidence to support the verdict, or in 
other words, that all reasonable minds must agree 
that it was plaintiff, and not defendant, Rogers, 
who transgressed the center line of the highway." 
"The testimony of plaintiff, corroborated by 
the passengers in his automobile, is sufficient 
15 
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basis for the jury's verdict, unless that testi-
mony is contrary to admitted physical facts." 
In this case, one of the ultimate questions of fact 
for the jury was: Which vehicle crossed the center line 
of the highway~ The jury determined that issue in favor 
of the defendant and the testimony of the passengers 
in defendant's automobile, and the physical facts sup-
port that determination. 
Mr. Matheson, driver of the defendant's truck, and 
Mr. Garfield, his passenger, testified the truck was as 
near the west edge of the oiled surface of the highway 
as possible without actually being on the shoulder. (R. 
177-222} The speed of the truck was not excessive, being 
45 to 50 miles per hour. (R. 176-220} The automobile 
of plaintiff approached the truck in an apparently normal 
manner (R. 176-221} except for its relative speed which 
was considerably faster than the defendant's truck was 
traveling. 
The physical facts consist of the debris left by the 
collision and the path of the Watkins vehicle from the two 
rim gouges at the point of impact. Three witnesses testi-
fied that they observed two gouge marks approximately 
five to s.even feet north of the bridge and about one and 
a half to two feet west of the center of the highway. 
Mr. Dalton stated that the path left by the tires of plain-
tiff's vehicle could be easily traced from the gouge marks 
to where the vehicle came to rest. (R. 252} Sheriff N~lson 
testified that the gouge marks were as Mr. Dalton placed 
them in his diagram and appeared to have been freshly 
made. (R. 265} Patrolman Semmons closely examined 
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the gouge n1arks and described the first and most south.: 
erly one as being about an inch to two inches deep and 
about two inches wide with a smooth interior (R; 307), 
and the second gouge Inark to the north as being longer 
and more jagged and sharply dipped at its southe-rn 
extremity and sloping out as it ran north. (R. 313) This 
is not the Ina.rk of a piece of the debris from the wreck 
or a tool frmn the truck being pressed into the highway 
by passing vehicle as plaintiff contends, but rathe-r shows 
the sharp impact of an object in forward motion. 
Plaintiff contends that inasmuch as the left front 
tire of the Ford was not thrown until just before- the 
vehicle came to rest, the gouges could not have been made 
by the rim of the vehicle. However, Mr. Burton testified 
that a piece of the tire and tube had been gouged out of 
the side and bottom of the tire (R. 261), and several wit-
nesses observed a piece of tire was embedded between 
the rim and tire of the left rear dual wheel of the truck, 
indicating that when the. car hit the left front corner of 
the truck bed, the tremendous force of the impact caused 
the left front wheel of the car to go underneath the bed 
and forced the wheel rim through the tire and into the 
surface of the highway making the gouge marks. After · 
the car had passed underneath the truck bed, its rolling 
motion caused the tire to go back on the rim, hence the 
tire marks commencing a few feet north of the gouge 
marks. 
The oiled portion of the highway at the point of im-
pact is approximately 19 feet wide. (R. 311) The bed 
of the truck is 94 inches wide. The truck was traveling 
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with its wheels on the edge of the oiled portion. This 
would place the left corner of the truck bed approxi-
mately one and a half feet from the center of the road. 
The testimony showed the gouge 1narks were approxi-
mately that distance from the center of the highway. 
Plaintiff places great stress upon the tire burns pic-
tured in Exhibit "G." Both 'Sheriff Nelson and Patrol-
man Semmons testified in rebuttal that Exhibit "G" does 
not accurately depict the path of plaintiff's vehicle. (R. 
269-327). 
The weight of the evidence clearly shows plaintiff'~ 
vehicle was traveling to the left of the center of the 
highway. The jury had an extensive and plausible basis 
for its determination as to who was traveling to the left 
of the center of the highway. 
The courts which have passed upon the question 
presented by this appeal have followed the rule announc-
ed in the Moser case, cited above. In the case of Hellwig 
v. Lomeliono, 33 N.E. 2nd 17 4 (Ill.), the collision occur-
red between two approaching vehicles on a bridge. The 
court held the question of negligence was a question of 
fact for the jury. The plaintiff received a verdict below 
and the defendant contended contributory negligence 
should have been found by the jury. The court pointed 
out the verdict of the jury would not be disturbed on 
appeal unless the evidence was so clearly insufficient 
to establish due care that all reasonable minds must 
conclude that there was contributory negligence. 
In Ward v. Martin, 147 S.W. 2nd 1027 (Ky.), the 
collision occurred between two approaching vehicles. 
18 
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Both partie8 clai1ned they were traveling to the right of 
the center of the highway. The jury returned a verdict 
for the plaintiff. The court held the question of who 
\nl.s traYeling to the left of the center is a question of fact 
for the jury and their determination would not be ~et 
a8ide on the appeal. 
In Brown v. \Yyoming Butane Gas Company, 205 
P2d 116 (\Yyo.), an accident occurred on a bridge be-
tween two gasoline tankers traveling in opposite direc-
tions. Both parties contended the other was on the left 
or wrong side of the road. The jury returned a verdict 
for the plaintiff. The Court held: 
"There was other conflicting evidence upon 
the location of these units when the collision oc-
curred, but sufficient has been recited to indicate 
that it was the duty of the jury to resolve th~se 
contradictions and under the rules of law men-
tioned above we are necessarily bound in this 
Court hy its conclusions." 
Plaintiff argues that there was insufficient evidence 
on which the jury might reasonably predicate a finding 
that the intoxication of plaintiff was a proximate result 
of the collision. In support of this proposition he cites 
the case of Fleming v. McMillan, 26 S.E. 2nd 8 (W.Va.) 
where the only evidence of intoxication was that various 
witnesses smelled liquor on his breath. Otherwise, there 
was nothing unusual in the conduct or conversation of 
defendant indicating intoxication. In another case cited, 
State v. Johnson, 76 Utah 84, 247 P. 909, the only evi-
dence of intoxication was that an officer observed a con-
siderable odor of liquor on defendant's breath three 
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hours after the accident. Moreover, that case involved 
a criminal charge where a different burden of proof ex-
ists ; that is, proof beyond a reasonable doubt. In Rogers 
v. Silverfleet System of Memphis, 180 S. 445 (La.), cited 
on page 26 of plaintiff's brief, the only evidence of in-
toxication was that Rogers, the plaintiff, drank a glass 
of beer and may have been drinking four or five hours 
before the accident. 
While the jury need not have found intoxication to 
be a proximate cause of this ac~ident in order to decide 
this case as they did, they might have reasonably so 
found from the evidence. We have a record of plaintiff's 
intoxicated condition from the time the defendant was 
first observed by Mr. Jack Scott at about 5 :00 o'clock 
p.m. on the day of the collision. (R. 127) From that 
time on a succession of witnesses testified to the intoxi-
cation of the plaintiff. Mr. Christenson observed plaintiff 
at about the same time as Mr. Scott and testified plain-
tiff was drunk and plain tiff admitted to him that he was 
drunk. (R. 137) Plaintiff had been in Ted's Bar earlier 
in the day. He returned about 6 :30 p.m. Mr. Farnsworth, 
the proprietor, stated he sold plaintiff a beer which 
plaintiff tipped over and Mr. Farnsworth saw he was in 
no condition for more beer. (R. 140) Plaintiff was in 
Milt's Circus Bar between 8 :00 and 8 :30 p.m. Mrs. Hirshi 
stated plaintiff was insulting and had been drinking. 
(R. 143) Mr. Cooley made the statement that at that time 
plaintiff had had too much to drink. (R. 144) Mr. Hills 
testified plaintiff had the appearance of being intoxi-
c~lted, (R. 150) an'd outside the 'tavern in the officers 
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car plaintiff adJnitted he had been drinking. (R. 151) 
The accident occurred shortly after the officer left plain-
tiff in hi~ car at. Cedar City. (R. 167-R. 1) Officer Sem-
nwns who eonducted the 1najor part of the investigation 
stated in his opinion the plaintiff was under the influ-
ence of intoxicating liquor when he observed him after 
the accident. Both Dr. Broadbent (R. 291) and nurse 
Xel~on, (R. 35±) stated plaintiff was intoxicated and the 
following morning plaintiff adJnitted to them he had been 
drinking. (R. 290 R. 355) 
Plaintiff contends that the fact that plaintiff's auto-
mobile approached defendant's automobile in a normal 
manner except for the speed of the automobile shows 
the sobriety of the plaintiff. The logical extension of that 
argun1ent is that every vehicle which is being propelled by 
a drunken driver must necessarily show some marked 
aberration. Such is not the case. The fact merely shows 
l\fr. \Vatkins did not change the course of his vehicle up 
to the time of impact even though under his own testi-
mony a collision appeared imminent. He claimed that he 
observed defendant's truck approaching his automobile 
partially on his side of the road for some distance but he 
took no action to avoid a collision other than to touch his 
brakes slightly. This action is illustrative of the conduct 
which might be expected from an individual in a drunken 
stuper rather than the conduct one would expect from 
an alert individual conscious of the impending danger. 
Intoxication, in and of itself, is not the immediate di-
rect cause of any accident. But it is a matter of common 
knowledge that persons in an intoxicated condition are 
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not competent to drive automobiles because of their im-
paired physical condition. They lack the power of ob-
servation, judgment, and ability to cope with the condi-
tions which are likely to be encountered upon the high-
way. It is the acts or omissions of persons in the im-
paired condition caused by the intoxication which directly 
causes automobile accidents. 
In this case the defendant drove his automobile from 
Cedar City to the point of the collision in at most, 33 min-
utes since Officer Hill's testimony, verified by the radio 
log, places him in Cedar City between 8:57p.m. and 9:24 
p.m., and the accident happened at a point some 32 miles 
distance at 9:30 p.m. In order to cover that distance in 
33 minutes, plaintiff must necessarily have averaged 60 
miles per hour. If allowance is made for time lost slow-
ing for other traffic and curves in the road, it becomes 
evident that plaintiff was exceeding 60 MPH on straight 
stretches of highway. He approached the automobile 
of the defendant at a high rate of speed. Under his 
own testimony he failed to do anything whatsoever to 
avoid the acc:i'dent even though he had an opportunity to 
do so and the great preponderance of the evidence shows 
he either drove his automobile onto the west or wrong 
side of the highway into and against the automobile of 
the defendant or lost control of i't with the same result. 
It is submitted that there was ample evidence from which 
the jury might reasonably have found as it did that the 
negligent conduct of the plaintiff, as aforesaid, was the 
sole or proximate cause of his own injuries. 
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POINT NO. II 
EVIDENCE OF PLAINTIFF'S INTOXICATION WAS 
'20PERLY SUBMITTED TO THE JURY AS AN ELEMENT 
·
1 F PLAINTIFF'S NEGLIGENCE. 
~-\s has been pointed out, there was sufficient evi-
dence frmn which the jury might reasonably ha.ve con-
eluded the intoxication of the plaintiff was a proxi1nate 
cause of the accident. This being the case, it was proper 
for the court to submit this issue to the jury as the court 
did in his instruction No. 5, which instruction we will 
have occasion to deal with in greater detail later. 
In Western States Grocery Company et al v. Mirt, 12~~ 
P 2d 267, (Okla.). a collision occurred between two ve-
hicles approaching each other. Defendant requested that 
the court give an instruction on intoxicating liquor. The 
court refused to give an instruction which read as fol-
lows: 
'"You are instructed that under the testilnony 
the defendants have plead as one of their defenses 
of (Sic) contributory negligence, that is to say, 
that the plaintiff, Roy ~1irt, was under the influ-
ence of intoxicating liquor at the time of this acei-
dent." 
"You are instructed that under the phrase 
·1mder the influenee of intoxieating liquor' means 
that if intoxicating liquor has so far affected the 
nervous system or the brains or museles that wil1 
tend to impair the abilitY of one to operate an 
automobile in the manner of an ordinarily eau-
tious man, in the full possession of his faeilities 
would operate or drive under like eonditions, then 
the driver is under the influenee of intoxicating 
lj_('lJOl''" 
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.. If you should find that the plaintiff was un-
der the influence of intoxicating liquor as above 
defined and that that constituted negligence on his 
part and if that directly or proximately caused or 
contributed to the accident and resulting injuries, 
then you are instructed you should return a ver-
dict for defendants, even though you should find 
that they were also guilty of negligence." 
The Court held : 
"We think the defendants were entitled to 
have said requested instruction or a similar one 
given. If plaintiff was driving his car on a pub-
lic highway while under the influence of intoxicat-
ing liquor, he was guilty of negligence per se 
(citations given). The requested instruction did 
not tell the jury that such negligence, if estab-
lished, constituted contributory negligence, but 
it properly defined intoxication and told the jury 
that if it found that plaintiff was guilty of such 
negligence, and further found that such negligence 
directly and proximately caused or contributed 
to the injury, he could not recover. This did not 
invade the province of the· jury. It left to the 
jury the determination of the vital factors, negli-
gence and proximate cause or contributing cause." 
In 'State v. Kendall, 203 N.W. 807 (Iowa), which 
was a case involving criminal prosecution for driving 
while intoxicated, the facts as stated by the court 
were: 
"Briefly stated, this case arose under the 
following circumstances: About or after mid-
night on the night of November 19, 1923, the de-
fendant was driving south on Main Street in the 
City of Council Bluffs in a Ford automobile. His 
car collided with a street car approaching from 
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the oppo~ite direction. ~everal witnesses testi-
fied again~t the defendant and ~l'Yt>ral testified 
for hin1. Son1e of the witne~~e~ on behalf of the 
State te~tified the defendant wa~ intoxicated at 
the tin1e. Others that he staggered when he at-
tempted to \Yalk: that he used abusive language 
toward the n1otonnan and conductor and that they 
sinelled intoxicating liquor on his breath. The 
undisputed testi1nony shows that after the colli-
sion the defendant alighted frmn his car and said, 
in addressing the motorman : ·Didn't you see me 
con1ing~ \Yhy the hell didn't you turn out~' To 
say the least, this inquiry could not come from a 
mind that was properly functioning." 
The Court held : 
·•At most there is a sharp conflict in the testi-
Inony as to whether or not the defendant was in-
toxicated. It was wholly a question for the jury 
and the nisi prius court was right in submitting 
it to the jury." 
Burgett v. Saginaw Logging Company et al, 85 P 2d 
271 ( \V ash.), concerned an accident between a truck be-
ing driven in a southerly direction and a bicycle travel-
ing north. Plaintiff, a three year old child, was riding 
on the crossbar of the bicycle. The complaint charged 
the driver of the truck for driving in excess of the law-
ful rate of speed and that he was under the influence of 
intoxicating liquor to such an extent that he did not have 
control of his automobile. Plaintiff received the verdict 
below. The evidence of intoxication amounted to a state-
ment by one witness that the truck driver was noticeably 
drunk about four and one-half hours prior to the aeci-
dent. The court below instructed in substance that vio-
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lation of the statute prohibiting the driving of vehicles 
upon public highways while intoxicated is negligence per 
se. The court h~ld the instruction was properly given 
and said: 
"If the condition of intoxication was estab-
lished then the only remaining question wa~; 
whether the existence of that condition was a 
proximate cause of the collision. In the instruc-
tion to the jury the trial court defined proximate 
cause ; the jury was instructed that the burden of 
proof is upon the respondent to establish by a fair 
preponderance of the evidence that appellant was 
negligent in the manner and way alleged by re-
spondent at the time and place of the accident; 
and that such negligence, if any, was the proxi-
mate cause of the injuries received by respond-
ent." 
The lower court concluded the issue of intoxication 
and proximate cause was a jury question. Instruction 
No. 5 given by the court in this case reads as follows: 
"You are instructed that it is a violation of 
the law of this state for any person who is under 
the influence of intoxicating liquor to be in actual 
physical control of any motor vehicle. 'Under the 
influence of intoxicating liquor' means in such 
condition from the use of intoxicating liquor so as 
to impair the person's ability to drive an automo-
bile in the manner. that an ordinarily prudent 
and cautious person in full possession of his 
faculties would operate a similar vehicle under 
like conditions. 
"If you find from a preponderance of evi-
dence in this case that the plaintiff, while driving 
his car immediately before and a:t the time of said 
accident, was under the influence of intoxicating 
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liquor a~ hPrPill!~pfore dt->tint>d, then lw \\'a~ guilty 
of negligence as a n1atter of law, and if you find 
fr01n a preponderance of the evidence that his con-
dition wa~ the sole or a proximate eontributing 
cause of the collision with -defendant's truck, then 
plaintiff cannot reeoYer and your verdict nmst he 
for the defendant.'' 
Said instruction is a correct statement of the law 
applicable under the eYidence of this case. The instruc-
tion merely infor1ns the jury that it is against the laws 
of this state to drive an automobile while under "the in-
fluence of intoxicating liquor." It then proceeds to de-
fine the tern1 "under the influence of intoxicating liquor." 
The burden of proving intoxication on part of the plain-
tiff was placed upon the defendant by the term "if you 
find from a preponderance of the evidence in the case." 
The court did not instruct the jury that the plaintiff 
was under the influence of intoxicating liquor but merely 
that if the jury so found then the defendant was guilty 
of negligence. Nor did the court instruct the jury that 
this negligence precluded a recovery on the part of the 
plaintiff unless the jury further found also from "a pre-
ponderance of the evidence" that the intoxicated condi-
tion was the "sole or a proximate contributing cause of 
the collision." 
Plaintiff complains of the court's refusal to give 
his requested instruction No. 1 to the effect that they 
should disregard the evidence in the case pertaining to 
the consumption of the beer by plaintiff is being im-
material. Such an instruction on the part of the court 
would have constituted a finding by the court that the 
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plaintiff was not intoxicated or that his intoxication 
was not a proximate or contributing cause of this acci-
dent. We have seen this is an issue for the jury which 
was properly submitted to the jury by the court in this 
case under instruction No. 5. 
POINT NO. III 
PLAINTIFF WAS NOT DEPRIVED OF A FAIR AND 
IMPARTIAL TRIAL BY THE IMPROPER ADMISSION OF 
EVIDENCE. 
The proposition that evidence is not admissible 
because one of the parties does not remember, or chooses 
not to remember, which ever the case may be, events 
which are probative of the issues to be decided is a novel 
one. If such a rule were adopted a party could control 
admission of adverse evidence simply by feigning ig-
norance. The plaintiff in this case had no difficulty re-
membering those events necessary to make a prima facie 
case of negligence against the defendant but very con-
veniently failed to remember his "drinking activity" in 
Cedar City before the accident. 
It may be true that evidence which tends to prove 
facts which are admitted or are not controverted will 
be more likely excluded where, if admitted, it would 
probably prejudice and mislead the jury. This rule, 
however, has no application to this case for the plain 
and simple reason that the intoxication of the plaintiff-
the issue to which all of the evidence complained of was 
addressed-was not admitted and was controverted or 
denied by the plaintiff. 
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.. A party eannot he depriYt>d of the hPnefitH 
of evidenee which it:' relevant and matPrial lw-
cant:'e it may alt:'o haYP a tendeney to prejudice the 
adYert:'e party in the e~'eS of the jlH~T·" 31 CJS 
907, ~ee. 186. 
It i~ contended the eYidence of plaintiff's intoxica-
tion prior to the accident and after the accident was too · 
remote. \Yhether evidence of intoxication should be 
sub1nitted to the jury is not determined by whether that 
evidence is exactly in point of time with the collision. 
The rule is illustrated by the following cases : 
The action of Stuart v. :.Me Yey, 87 P 2d -1--!6, (Idaho), 
involved the collision of two approaching vehicles. De-
fendant sought to introduce evidence of plaintiff's in-
toxication approximately three hours prior to the acci-
dent. This was excluded by the trial court. The appellant 
court held: 
"The evidence sought to be elicited in the in-
stant case referred to a pe-riod of time during the 
afternoon and up until 6 :00 in the evening of the 
day of the collision, a period ending about three 
hours previous to the collision. There would seem 
to be no room for argument that evidence of the 
drinking intoxicating liquors and the condition of 
a person with reference to intoxication is adinis-
sible upon the question of intoxication, if such 
evidence is not too remote in point of time, the 
fact of remoteness in point of time going rather 
to the weight of the evidence, than to its admis-
sibility, and evidence remote in point of time to 
the extent of 8 to 10 hours has been held properly 
admissible. Cases cited from Philadelphia, Okla-
homa, Texas, Massachusetts, California, Iowa, 
~fissouri, and New Mexico. 
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"The evidence sought to be elicited was ad-
missible, not appearing to be too re1note." 
In Maier v. Minidoka County, 105 P 2d 1076 (Idaho), 
the evidence sought to be introduced was the odor of 
alcohol on the motorist's breath at the hospital two and 
one-half hours after the accident. It was contended that 
inasmuch as the evidence was after the accident in point 
of time that Stuart ·v. McVey (supra) would not apply. 
The court held that evidence of intoxication after the 
accident was just as relevant as such evidence before 
the accident and its remoteness too, went to the weight 
to be given it and not to its admissibility. 
In Callahan v. Prewitt, 13 N.W. 2nd 660 (Neb.), the 
acciden1t occurred on a bridge between two approaching 
vehicles. Evidence that the plaintiff had been drinking 
shortly before the accident was admitted. Verdict was 
for defendant and plaintiff assigns as heir the admission 
of drinking. The court held : 
"Assignments 4, 5 6 and 7 relate to the use of 
intoxicating liquors by Doerfler at a tavern at 
about 500 feet west of the Nebraska State Line 
in Wyoming immediately before proceeding to the 
point where the fatality occurred. The· distance 
from the scene of the accident was but a few miles 
and the interval between was evidently but a mat-
ter of minutes. In the light of the other evidence 
this could not be considered evidence of intoxica-
tion, but we have no doubt, because of the brief 
interval of time and the closeness of this relation-
ship to the accident and the incidents leading to it, 
of its admissibility as a circumstance profer to be 
considered by the jury in determining whether or 
not Doufler was guilty of negligence which was 
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the proximate ('HU~e of tlw <wt·idPnt \\'hieh eont ri-
buted to it." 
X or \\'as the testimony about the YPry belligerent, 
obstreperous behaYior of the plaintiff and his use of pro-
fane language inadn1issible. A seriously injured person 
in a nor1nal condition realizing his condition and that 
he might die is appreeiatiYe of the help of others and 
not resentful. In Lynn v. Stinnette, 31 P 2d 764 (Ore.), 
plaintiff's intestate was struck and killed while pushing 
a bicycle on the side of a road. There was evidence intro-
duced of the consumption of alcohol beverage by the de-
cedent and his conduct shortly before the accident. The 
court said: 
"Evidence that the decedent, while at nits. 
Cmnpbell's house, talked in a loud voice was rele-
vant as tending to show what, if any, effect the 
beer had on him. It is common knowledge that 
intoxicating liquor has varying effects on differ-
ent individuals. Some it impells to boisterousness 
and loud talking: others, to quarrelsomeness and 
sullenness." 
Jones v. State, 92 S.W. 2nd 246 (Texas) involved a 
prosecution for driving while intoxicated. At the hos-
pital appellant became violently loud and obscene in his 
talk, so much so that the sheriff was called. He testified 
that the appellant was drunk. Another witness who saw 
him a short time before the wreck also testified that frmn 
appellant's conduct" and talk he thought appellant was 
intoxicated. The court said: 
"Appellant brings forward a complaint be-
cause the court, over the objection, permitted the 
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sheriff to testify that when he saw appellant at 
the hospital and that appellant was drunk, the ob-
jection being that it was an hour or an hour and 
a half after the wreck before the sheriff saw ap-
pellant, and that the doctor had given him two 
or three strong hypodermics, in connection with 
which he had probably used denatured alcohol. 
The court was not in error in admitting the 
sheriff's testimony. The objections went to the 
weight and not the admissibility of the evidence." 
And so in the case at bar, it is submitted that the 
evidence of plaintiff's conduct before the accident, at 
the scene of the accident and in the Cedar City Hospi-
tal was admissible even though it might have had a 
tendency to prejudice the plaintiff in the eyes of the jury. 
The evidence was neither too remote or extraneous to 
the issue of the intoxication but had a definite bearing 
on the question of the negligence of the plaintiff. It was 
proper for the court to admit that evidence for the jury's 
consideration in their determination of that question. 
POINT NO. IV 
THE COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY UP-
ON THE PLAINTIFF'S THEORY OF THE EVIDENCE. 
It is true that a party to a lawsuit is entitled to 
have his theory of the evrdence submitted to the jury 
to the extent that his theory. is supported by the evi-
dence and pleadings in the case. While this is true, this 
does not mean tha:t the court must give the exact instruc-
tion requested by the plaintiff; that the court must fol-
low the exact language . of the requested instruction; 
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or give an instruction which is not supported by the 
eYidence, is confusing, or does not correctly state the 
law applicable to the case. In Toone v. O'Neill Con-
struction Company, -10 P tah :2(i5, 1:21 P. 10, cited on 
page 36 of plaintiff's brief, the appellant c01nplains of 
the court's refusal to give a certain instruction. The 
court said on page :2S3 of the Utah Report: 
.. "\Yithout ·now passing upon the question of 
whether the foregoing instruction was too broad 
in view of the evidence, we concede that a party 
is entitled to have his case subn1itted to the jury 
upon the theory of his evidence as well as upon 
the theory of the whole evidence. One way the 
court n1ight have followed in charging the jury 
would have been to charge them in separate 
instructions, first in accordance with respondent's 
evidence; and, second, in accordance with appel-
lants' evidence which re'la:ted to the proposition 
covered by the instruction in question, and each 
instruction have directed the jury to return a 
verdict in accordance with their findings upon 
that question. The court was not bound to charge 
the jury in separate instructions, but could cover 
the question in one without offending against 
appellant's right. 
Appellant's theory of the evidence was suffi-
ciently covered by what the court· told the jury 
and hence it was not prejudiced by the court's 
modification referred to. 
In Miller v. Utah Consolidated Mining Co., et al., 
53 Utah 366, 178 P: 771, the court said at page 378 of the 
·Utah Reports: 
"The defendant was entitled to have its 
theory of the case submitted to the jury upon 
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proper instructions so long as the theory was 
based on some substantial testimony, not neces-
sarily by separate instructions, but by instruc-
tions covering the question involving both tlie 
plaintiff's and the defendant's theories. From 
the foregoing instructions given by the trial court 
it is obvious that this is not only what the trial 
court attempted, but substantially did as fully 
and fairly as it might have done by the giving 
of the request denied the defendant." 
In Platt v. Utah Light and Traction Company, 57 
Utah 7, 169 P. 868 the court in reviewing instructions 
which in its opinion should have been given on page 13 
of the Utah Reports says : 
"Had the court given either of the instruc-
tions as requested or in substance and effect, 
we would be inclined to hold that the issue pre-
sented by the defendant's answer was sufficiently 
called to the attention of the jury, and its find-
ings on that particular issue sufficiently deter-
mined." 
As was said in Potts v. Armour and Co., 39 Atlantic 
2d 552 (Md.): 
"Trial court may instruct jury upon the law 
of the case either by granting requested instruc-
tions or by instructions of its own on particular 
issues, or on the case as a whole, or by several 
or all of such methods." 
The test is not whether the court gave the instruc-
tions requested by the defendant but whether the court 
properly instructed the jury upon the theory of plain-
tiff's case in those instances where a request was made 
and the evidence warranted the giving of an instruc-
tion. 
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Plaintiff complains of the court's refusal to give 
plaintiff's requested instruction No. 3 which reads as 
follows: 
"You are instructed that vou must disregard 
the evidence in this case pert~ining to the drink-
ing of beer by the plaintiff prior to the tiine of 
the accident involved in this matter, if you shall 
find and believe from a fair. preponderance of 
the evidence that such drinking of beer by the 
plaintiff did not so impair his physical and men-
tal faculties as to constitute a proximate or con-
tributing cause to the collision." 
The requested instruction was not supported by the 
evidence, was confusing, and did not accurately or cor-
rectly state the law applicable to the evidence in this 
case. The instruction assumes that the plaintiff's con-
dition of intoxication was induced by the consumption 
of beer. While the evidence shows that the. plaintiff 
was intoxicated, there is no evidence in the record· that 
this state was induced by the consumption of beer .. The 
instruction is confusing in that the jury is instructed 
that it must disregard the evidence pertaining to drink-
ing before they are told the condition under which they 
should disregard this evidence. A much more logical 
sequence would be to first state. the condition and then 
what it might do if it found that condition to exist. 
The instruction was obviously intended to cover the 
question of intoxication, but does not legally define 
intoxication nor instruct the jury on the defendant's 
burden to prove intoxication by a ·preponderance of the 
evidence. 
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As has been pointed out previously, the court's 
instruction No. 5 was a correct instruction of the law 
applicable to the evidence in this case. In that instruc-
tion the court defined the term "under the influence of 
intoxicating liquor," informed the jury that it required 
a preponderance of the evidence to find that the plaintiff 
was under the influence of intoxicating liquor, and fur-
ther informed the jury that it must also find from a 
preponderance of the evidence that his condition was a 
sole or proximate contributing cause of the collision in 
order to deny plaintiff's recovery on this gr:ound. 
Plaintiff alleged in his complaint that the defend-
ant drove his car onto the wrong side of the highway. 
The only assertion of negligence on defendant's part was 
the evidence of the plaintiff that the defendant's auto-
mobile overlapped the center of the highway as it 
approached the point of impact (R. 60). There is no 
evidence that the defendant did not observe plaintiff's 
automobile that is, failed to keep a proper lookout, like-
wise there is no evidence that the defendant had an 
opportunity to alter the course of his automobile. Plain-
tiff testified he turned in or toward the west just before 
entering the bridge. Defendant's driver said the lights 
of plaintiff's car seemed to come toward his truck after 
the cab of the truck had passed the Ford automobile. 
The two cars were approaching each other at an ex-
tremely high closing speed, probably in excess of 100 
miles per hour. Under either party's evidence, defend-
ant's driver would not have sufficient time to react to the 
danger of the collision soon enough to make any attempt 
to avoid it. 
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Thus it it' seen that in his reqne~ted instruction No. 
ti, plaintiff sought to enlarge the issue of defendant's 
negligence in a 1nanner whieh "·a~ not supported h~- any 
of the evidence in the ea~e. 
In its instruction No. 1, the court instructed the 
jury in part as follows : 
HPlainti:ff contends that the defendant com-
pany "·as negligent in the operation of the truck 
in that the driver of the truck was then and there 
operating said truck upon the east portion of 
the said highway while driving south, and that 
such act constituted negligence on the part of 
the defendant and occasioned the injuries and · 
damages allegedly suffered." 
In instruction No. 3, the (>ourt instructed the jury 
in part as follows: 
"In this regard you are instructed that it is 
the duty of anyone operating a 1notor vehicle 
on the highway of this sta;te to drive such motor 
vehicle upon the right hand side of the road, 
particularly when another vehiele is approaching 
from the opposite direction. 
If, therefore, you find from a preponder-
ance of the evidence, that defendant at the time 
and point of the collision with plaintiff's auto-
mobile and immediately prior thereto was oper-
ating its truck to the left of the mid-point of the 
highway, then you are instructed that the de-
fendant was negligent; and if you further find 
from a preponderance of the evidence that such 
negligence proximately caused injuries and dam-
ages to the plaintiff, then you are instructed that 
you should return a verdict in favor of the plain-
tiff and against the defendant and award damages 
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to the plaintiff as in these instructions set forth, 
unless you further find tha;t the negligence of the 
plaintiff, if any, contributed to cause his injuries 
as in these instructions set forth." 
It is submitted that the court did not err in denying 
plaintiff's requested instruction No. 6 and that the court 
properly and adequately instructed the jury upon the 
plaintiff's theory of the evidence, that is, the manner • 
in which the defendant may have been negligent, in the 
court's instructions No. 1 and 3. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion it appears that the jury after a fair 
and impartial trial in which no improper prejudicial 
evidence was admitted and after having been properly 
instructed upon the plaintiff's theory of the evidence 
as well as upon the theory of the whole evidence, de-
cided the issues of this case in favor of the defendant. 
Not only is there sufficient evidence from which the 
jury might have reasonably so determined the issues 
of this case, but their judgment is overwhelmingly sus-
tained by the preponderance of the evidence. 
Respectfully submitted, 
STEW ART, CANNON & HANSON 
Attorneys for Defendwnts 
and Respondents 
EDWIN B. CANNON 
REX J. HANSON 
ERNEST F. BALDWIN, JR. 
DON J. HANSON 
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